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Grounding Suicide Terrorism in Death 
Anxiety and Consumer Capitalism 
JAMES M. DONOVAN* 
Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that 
we will sacrifice all the beauty of our lives, will imprison our-
selves in totems, taboos, crosses, blood sacrifices, steeples, 
mosques, races, armies, flags, nations, in order to deny the fact 
of death, which is the only fact we have.1 
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Huxley is known to history as “Darwin’s Bulldog” for his 
forceful advocacy of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution.2 As part of 
that debate, he is claimed to have once remarked that “we must learn what 
is true in order to do what is right.”3 Whether speaking about physical or 
social processes, our understanding is enhanced when we know how the 
pieces fit together. 
Suicide terrorism is one topic about which we would like to do the 
right thing. For most, that would include finding a way to prevent suicide 
terrorist attacks. To the extent that prevention depends on removing the 
motivations that exist for those who engage in the activity, it can be dif-
ficult to learn what actually drives individuals to engage in suicide terror-
ism, particularly because the perpetrators are inevitably unavailable to 
tell us their reasons. As a result, decision-makers often fall back on 
* James M. Donovan (J.D. Loyola New Orleans 2003; Ph.D. Tulane University 1994; B.A. Uni-
versity of Tennessee at Chattanooga 1981) is Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Kentucky’s J. David Rosenberg College of Law. A previous draft
of this paper benefited from roundtable discussion at the Secção de Sociologia do Direito e da
Justiça da Associação Portuguesa de Sociologia [Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on
Sociology of Law] [RCSL/SDJ] that took place in Lisbon, Portugal from September 12-13, 2018.
1. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 91 (Michael Joseph Ltd. 5th ed. 1968) (1963).
2. But see John van Wyhe, Why There Was No ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’: Thomas Henry Huxley’s
Famous Nickname, 35 LINNEAN 26 (2019), https://www.ca1-tls.edcdn.com/Linnean_Vol-35_1_
April-2019_Web.pdf?mtime=20190624175025.5. 
3. CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD O. WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN OF MIND vi (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1983). 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:45 PM 
2 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
assumptions and stereotypes that serve other purposes, but which rarely 
lead to useful or truthful insights on the problem. 
This article examines an influential theory on suicide attacker moti-
vations, the Significance Quest Theory, and suggests that this death anx-
iety approach can be improved by shifting its focus toward the related, 
but more comprehensive, Terror Management Theory. The theoretical 
productivity of this realignment is tested by examining the relationship 
between suicide attacks and one of the variables thought to trigger the 
underlying anxieties: the local pressures from global consumer capital-
ism. After describing the relationship between death anxiety and suicide 
terrorism generally, this article concludes by applying these insights to 
the ethnographic context of Egypt. 
II.  WHAT WE MEAN BY “TERRORISM” 
The first step toward finding what is true regarding any subject is to 
identify what one intends to speak about. Definitions are not themselves 
true or false statements, but rather, are only more or less useful. They are 
necessary to collect instances of the same kind from which the truth can 
then be discerned. Accordingly, referents for important terms should be 
plainly described to eliminate ad hoc ambiguities that muddy the path 
toward a meaningful and helpful conclusion. 
Even a casual survey of instances of the use of terrorism shows that 
it is a contested category, often used as a ready-at-hand accusation ap-
plied to any disruptive activity disfavored by those in power.4 Oil com-
pany executives, for example, have attempted to score points by labeling 
 
 4. See Michael Loadenthal, Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Label-
ing, 13 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 74, 95 (2019). See also ALEX SCHMID & 
A.J. JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA 
BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 5-6 (1988) (analyzing 109 different definitions of “terror-
ism”). Schmid & Jongman use their study to construct the following thorough definition: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or po-
litical reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence 
are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally cho-
sen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic tar-
gets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-
based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, 
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
Id. at 28. 
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pipeline protestors as “terrorists,”5 and a recent effort to make the Georgia 
state code available for free online has been characterized as a “strategy 
of terrorism” by the State.6 The “terrorist” label serves as the modern 
analogy to epithets of communist in the 1950s, or witch from long ago, in 
that they all share the quality of lacking firm content other than to cate-
gorize the target as deserving per se condemnation. 
Formal settings fare little better. The UN Security Council has iden-
tified specific acts as terrorism while avoiding a general definition.7 Re-
gional instruments have erred in the opposite direction by offering “more 
than one hundred different proposed definitions of terrorism” between 
1936 and 1981.8 The diversity of those outcomes, however, has frustrated 
the effort to carve out a universally recognized customary international 
crime.9 
The present discussion favors restricting the category of terrorism 
to acts which seek to provoke a change of policy by inflicting violence or 
the threat of violence upon innocent civilians, rather than directly target-
ing the policymakers responsible for the contested circumstances, or their 
agents.10 Without the criterion of targeting innocent proxies, terrorism be-
comes functionally indistinguishable from routine military conflicts. One 
strategic assumption is presumably that threatened civilians will exert 
pressure on authorities to meet the demands of the assailants. Alterna-
tively, or, in systems where civilians lack any direct political authority 
over the government, there is an assumption that the authorities have ei-
ther compassion for their citizens, or fear of negative judgments on the 
international stage sufficient to change their course. 
This definition differs from some by requiring what other defini-
tions may permit, namely, that the hallmark of terrorism is the targeting 
of the morally innocent in order to provoke a change from a third party.11 
For example, Per Bauhn argues that sacrificing the morally innocent to 
 
 5. Valerie Richardson, Dakota Access Pipeline Executive Compares Lawless Protestors to 
Terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/15/da-
kota-access-exec-compares-protesters-terrorists/. 
 6. Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials Online, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.
html. 
 7. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (2006). 
 8. JEFFREY D. SIMON, LONE WOLF TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE GROWING THREAT 
259 (2013). 
 9. SAUL, supra note 7, at 318. 
 10. C.A.J. Coady, The Morality of Terrorism, 60 PHIL. 47, 52 (1985). 
 11. See Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, 31 INT’L SEC. 
49, 51 (2006) (terming this the “attrition” goal of terrorism amongst the other identified goals of 
intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding). 
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intimidate others may be “a feature of some political terrorist acts, [but 
not] all of them.”12 Other offerings concede the targeting of noncombat-
ants as part of the definition, but expand this term to also encompass gov-
ernment officials who direct combat and military individuals who are not 
actively engaged in combat at the moment of the terrorist attack.13 These 
inclusions may satisfy a requirement of targeting technical noncombat-
ants in the sense that they are not actively firing weapons at the moment 
of the attack. However, these inclusions arguably violate the spirit of the 
broader definition by protecting those who have the power to offer the 
demanded concessions or who have an ongoing history of enforcing the 
challenged rules, and in any event are not “innocent” in the same sense 
as ordinary civilians. 
Another way this definition varies from others is that it does not 
categorically exclude states from the list of those who can commit acts of 
terrorism.14 Although most states hold that only non-state actors can be 
considered terrorists,15 this rhetoric can be seen as an attempt to portray 
one’s own actions as legitimate military exercises, while construing the 
actions of others as potentially illegitimate war crimes. The inconsistency 
of this posture is quickly exposed by the ease with which states accuse 
one another of terrorism.16 A state may even go so far as to baldly propose 
plans that plainly cross the line into terrorism. For example, President 
Trump called to attack jihadist leaders by “taking out their families.”17 
President Trump later threatened to target Iranian sites of cultural 
 
 12. PER BAUHN, ETHICAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE SACRIFICING OF THE 
INNOCENT 74 (1989). 
 13. Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work, 31 INT’L SEC. 42, 52 (2006) (including 
military targets in his analysis to find that “[g]roups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered 
attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives.”). 
 14. Kydd and Walter strike a balance by, on the one hand, “not focus[ing] on state terrorism 
because states face very different opportunities and constraints in their use of violence, and [be-
cause] the two cases are [not] similar enough to be profitably analyzed together,” while on the other 
hand, defining terrorism in such a way that state terrorism is not necessarily precluded. Kydd & 
Walter, supra note 11, at 52. 
 15. ALEX P. SCHMID, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM RESEARCH 48 (2011). 
 16. See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Accuses Benin of Abetting Libyan Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 1988. See also Fred Pleitgen, Iranian Foreign Minister Accuses US of ‘State Terrorism’ as 
Country’s Parliament Votes to Designate US Forces as ‘Terrorists’ (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:08 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/middleeast/iran-zarif-united-states-intl/index.html. 
 17. John Fund, Trump’s Call to Kill Family Members of Terrorists is Quarter-Baked, NAT’L 
REV. (Dec. 18, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428719/kill-terrorists-
families-gangsta-trump. 
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heritage,18 an act which would constitute a war crime,19 but would also be 
terroristic because civilians were the intended casualties. If attacking non-
combatants to coerce military targets is the core criterion that defines ter-
rorism, proposing this strategy as state policy would qualify as “state ter-
rorism.” Despite the clear possibility of terrorist intentions by some state 
actors, the majority of data on terrorism typically excludes state-author-
ized engagements that target noncombatants, perhaps placing them under 
the category of “collateral damage.” 
The stricter standard for “noncombatant” offered here has been de-
fended elsewhere.20 Even if the available data is not consistently sorted to 
this level of detail, the present definition reliably identifies acts that sat-
isfy the key elements, allowing for a consistent comparison of events in 
order to isolate helpful relationships and trends. Under this definition, 
political assassinations or targeting soldiers—for example, the bombing 
of the USS Cole—are at best crimes, but not terrorism. U.S. prosecutors 
correctly declined to charge the Fort Hood shooter as a terrorist because 
he had made deliberate efforts to target soldiers and avoid civilians.21 
Similarly, under this standard, it is difficult to argue that the 1985 
Oklahoma City bombing, which targeted a government building but in-
curred substantial collateral civilian casualties, was an act of terrorism. 
The perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh claimed that he “did not know there 
was a daycare center inside the building,” and that, had he known, it 
might have given him pause to switch targets because “that’s a large 
amount of collateral damage.”22 It would be harder still to argue that the 
bombing constituted an act of terrorism while also maintaining that the 
United States’ use of drones to kill military targets in civilian settings is 
not.23 Neither is probably terrorism in the strict sense since civilians were 
not the primary targets. 
 
 18. Martin Chulov et al., Trump Vows to Hit 52 Sites ‘Very Hard’ if Iran Retaliates Over 
Suleimani Killing, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2020, 5:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2020/jan/05/donald-trump-vows-to-hit-52-sites-very-hard-if-iran-retaliates-for-suleimani-killing. 
 19. See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 
27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_07244.pdf. See also Hague Convention of 
1907, annex, art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 20. James A. Donovan, Civilian Immunity and the Rebuttable Presumption of Innocence, 5 J. 
L. SOC’Y 409, 450-54 (2004). 
 21. PETER BERGEN, UNITED STATES OF JIHAD: WHO ARE AMERICA’S HOMEGROWN 
TERRORISTS AND HOW DO WE STOP THEM? 84 (2016). 
 22. SIMON, supra note 8, at 48. 
 23. Some may argue that McVeigh was an independent actor, and thus only his acts were 
terrorism. State actions are sometimes stipulated as necessarily falling outside the criteria that sig-
nal an event as terrorism. The justification for this exclusion may be because state misdeeds are 
already liable under existing rules against war crimes and human rights violations. See Press Re-
lease, Security Council, Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-
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III.  WHAT WE MEAN BY “SUICIDE TERRORISM” 
Assuming that we have a solid grasp of what it means for an act to 
be terrorism, we may believe that the elements of the subset suicide ter-
rorism become immediately clear: Suicide terrorism is a form of terror-
ism by which the attackers must kill themselves in order for the attack on 
innocent noncombatants to be successful. Common instances include det-
onating a bomb in a shopping center or steering a car into a sidewalk café. 
It is not the death itself, but the perpetrator’s intent to die that serves as 
the hallmark of suicide terrorism. Many terrorists are killed during attacks 
(e.g., the 2002 Moscow theatre hostage crisis by Chechen separatists24), 
but their deaths are not always an essential element of the plan, only col-
lateral consequences of its execution. The literature therefore recognizes 
a distinction between true suicide terrorism, and what has been termed 
“Mumbai Style” attacks in which the terrorists’ deaths may have been the 
most likely foreseeable outcome of the plot but which remain an outcome 
the attackers will seek to avoid as long as possible, or even completely.25 
The “why” of suicide terrorism has often been claimed to be that the 
strategy is more effective than general terrorism.26 Because detonation 
can be timed for optimal impact, one report found that each suicide attack 
averaged 9.28 deaths as compared to the 1.92 deaths from general terror-
ist attacks.27 A similar gap exists on the question of whether suicide ter-
rorism is more effective at achieving the intended strategic objectives: 
Pape concludes that suicide terrorism is “associated with gains for the 
 
Terrorism Committee to Develop Long-Term Strategy to Defeat Terror, U.N. Press Release 
SC/7276 (Jan. 18, 2002) (quoting Jeremy Greenstock, Committee Chairman: “Concerning State 
terrorism, the Committee had taken the trouble to proceed by consensus and keep subjectivism to 
a minimum, he said. Resolution 1373 (2001) was the primary guide for the Committee, but the 
Committee was also conscious of the 12 international Conventions on the subject, and none of them 
referred to State terrorism, which was not an international legal concept. If States abused their 
power, they should be judged against international conventions dealing with war crimes, interna-
tional human rights and international humanitarian law.”). The present discussion does not recog-
nize a meaningful distinction between state and non-state actors as a criterion to decide whether an 
attack is or is not terrorism. Although some statements from then-UN Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan appear to favor excluding states from charges of terrorism, at other times he arguably favors 
the position offered here, that “any deliberate attack on innocent civilians, regardless of one’s cause, 
is unacceptable and fits into the definition of terrorism”. See also Press Conference with Foreign 
Minister Kamal Kharrazi (unofficial transcript) (Jan. 26, 2002),https://www.un.org/sg/en/con-
tent/sg/press-encounter/2002-01-26/press-conference-foreign-minister-kamal-kharrazi-unofficial. 
 24. Richard Pilch & Adam Dolnik, The Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators, 
Their Tactics, and the Russian Response, 8 INT’L NEGOT. 577, 582 (2003). 
 25. Mark Dechesne & Bryn Brandt-Law, Suicide Terrorism, in HANDBOOK OF SUICIDAL 
BEHAVIOUR 139, 141 (Updesh Kumar ed., 2017). 
 26. See DIEGO MURO, WHEN DOES TERRORISM WORK? (2019) (describing a general treat-
ment on the effectiveness of terrorism). 
 27. Dechesne & Brandt-Law, supra note 25, at 150. 
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terrorists’ political cause about half the time,”28 while general terrorism 
is reported to attain only a seven percent success rate.29 More detailed 
research, however, has concluded that suicides “appear to present little to 
no advantages over non-suicide attacks, especially given the significant 
costs associated with them.”30 According to Kydd and Walter, the range 
of likely effectiveness is narrow and the attritional suicide bombings ap-
pear to be effective only against democracies because they are “more con-
strained in their ability to retaliate,” and are more likely to capitulate to 
demands than authoritarian societies.31 Given such limited and uncertain 
outcomes, the full tally of costs is likely to exceed rational benefits. Less 
obvious motivations than body counts should therefore be considered 
when deliberating the cause of suicide terrorism. 
The conceptual problem arises in that, while most persons would 
abhor the use of civilian casualties to advance political goals, such actions 
are not beyond the ken of the ordinary observer. Terrorists may be crude 
criminals, but we nonetheless can understand what goes through their 
minds as they plot their heinous strategies. Their own deaths are a likely, 
but possibly avoidable, outcome. The true suicide terrorist, though, be-
cause he intends and may even want to die, arguably exceeds our imagi-
native empathy.32 
What unsettles observers about suicide terrorism centers not on the 
willingness to sacrifice innocents to advance political objectives—ordi-
nary warfare does as much, as the carpet bombing of Dresden and the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated—but rather 
on the reported eagerness with which such assignments of self-annihila-
tion are often sought and executed. Many suicide terrorists are said to be 
so excited by the idea that they seek out organizations promising the best 
opportunities.33 The hope of becoming an honored martyr surpasses loy-
alty to a cause or group. Because “his sense of security is derived from 
his passionate attachment and not from the excellence of his cause,”34 
 
 28. ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 64 
(2005). 
 29. Abrahms, supra note 13, at 51. 
 30. Joseph Mroszczyk, Dying for a Reason: An Empirical Assessment of the Tactical Utility 
of Suicide Operations (2018), (Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file with Northeast-
ern University). 
 31. Kydd & Walter, supra note 11, at 61. 
 32. Emad E. Aysha, Islamist Suicide Terrorism and Erich Fromm’s Social Psychology of 
Modern Times, 5 J. SOC. & POL. PSYCH. 82, 82-83 (2017). 
 33. ARIEL MERARI, DRIVEN TO DEATH: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SUICIDE 
TERRORISM 121 (2010). 
 34. ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS 
85 (Harper Perennial Mod. Classics reissued ed. 2010) (1951). 
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being “a fighter for the cause becomes more important than the cause 
itself.”35 The idea of someone lacking even the wish or hope to live and 
instead rushing headlong to extinguish themselves in furtherance of a 
sometimes lightly-held cause is uniquely disturbing because most of us 
strive to survive. Our discomfort often leads us to dismiss the actor as 
crazy or mentally ill. 
Partisans of military conflicts are not typically known for a serious 
interest in what motivates opponents. The natural default is to depict the 
enemy as unreasonable, unnatural, certainly evil, or even arguably sub-
human.36 Terrorists may be characterized in even harsher terms because 
they target innocent civilians. For example, after the September 11, 2001 
suicide attacks in New York City (more commonly known as 9/11), Pres-
ident George W. Bush stated that the terrorists acted because “they hate 
our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our free-
dom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”37 Although 
framed as a description of the terrorists’ point of view, such statements 
are known to be inaccurate, conveying only what motivations the speak-
ers project onto the actors.38 This depiction of terrorists offers little op-
portunity for a solution other than to seek their annihilation which, not 
coincidentally, is often the path pursued. 
One advocate for the illness model concluded that suicide terrorists 
are “so consumed by pain, fear, crisis, and other personal problems that 
the opportunity costs of their suicide becomes quite affordable . . . . vol-
unteering to carry out a suicide attack would be like raising your hand 
and saying, ‘Hi, I have serious mental health problems.’”39 This glib char-
acterization well reflects our own society’s posture that suicidal tenden-
cies are inherently unhealthy. If individuals who commit suicide are 
therefore necessarily ill, all the more so are suicide terrorists who wish to 
take others with them. 
 
 35. JERROLD M. POST, THE MIND OF THE TERRORIST: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 
FROM THE IRA TO AL-QAEDA 61 (2007). 
 36. Jeanne M. Woods & James M. Donovan, “Anticipatory Self-Defense” and Other Stories, 
14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (2005). 
 37. George W. Bush, Former President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session 
of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20, 
2001), in 37 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1347, 1348, https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-24/pdf/WCPD-2001-09-24-Pg1347.pdf. 
 38. SCOTT ATRAN, TRENDS IN SUICIDE TERRORISM: SENSE AND NONSENSE 5 (Aug. 2004), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268488742_trends_in_suicide_terrorism_sense_and_
nonsense/. 
 39. ADAM LANKFORD, THE MYTH OF MARTYRDOM: WHAT REALLY DRIVES SUICIDE 
BOMBERS, RAMPAGE SHOOTERS, AND OTHER SELF-DESTRUCTIVE KILLERS 8, 174 (2013). 
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Consequently, we experience a certain resistance to the evidence 
that, despite our cultural predisposition, suicide terrorists are not uniquely 
mentally ill. In fact, among experts, the suggestion that suicide attacks 
are the result of mental illness has always been a minority view. First, the 
epidemiology of mental illness and suicidal tendencies does not track the 
rise and fall of suicide attacks. Nor does the theory account for the demo-
graphic skew of suicide terrorists toward the middle class,40 unless one is 
also prepared to suggest that persons from those backgrounds are 
uniquely vulnerable to psychological disfunction leading to suicide.41 
More pointedly, direct evidence exists that puts the mental illness 
hypothesis to rest. Ariel Merari and his colleagues conducted a controlled 
study of the personality types of would-be suicide attackers. They found 
that a majority (60%) of would-be suicides were diagnosed as dependent-
avoidant personality types, as opposed to only 16% of controls.42 By this, 
Merari means that the would-be suicide attackers possessed “a pro-
nounced lack of self-confidence, difficulty in making decisions inde-
pendently, reliance on others’ opinions, reluctance to express disagree-
ment out of fear that this may result in disapproval and rejection, and 
willingness to carry out unpleasant tasks to please others.”43 Avoidant 
personalities, moreover, are characterized by “timidity and fear of criti-
cism, of being shamed or ridiculed.”44 
The illness model, though, demands more than finding a consistent 
personality profile, even an impressionable and compliant one. Merari 
offers further data that speaks directly to the mental illness hypothesis. 
He found that 40% of suicide bombers had suicidal tendencies, as com-
pared to none in the control and attack organizer groups.45 This finding 
initially appears to support the belief that suicide attackers display signs 
of mental illness. However, viewing within-group comparisons under-
mines that simplistic conclusion. Merari reports that among those failed 
attackers who actually pushed the button to execute a planned attack, only 
25% fit the suicidal profile, as compared to 45.5% of the eleven who did 
 
 40. MERARI, supra note 33, at 75-77. See also SCOTT ATRAN, TALKING TO THE ENEMY: 
FAITH, BROTHERHOOD, AND THE (UN)MAKING OF TERRORISTS 113, 115 (2010). 
 41. See e.g., Sang-Uk Lee et al., Suicide Rates across Income Levels: Retrospective Cohort 
Data on 1 Million Participants Collected between 2003 and 2013 in South Korea, 27 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 258, 258 (2017) (arguing that risk for suicide increases as socioeconomic status 
falls). 
 42. MERARI, supra note 33, at 112. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ariel Merari et al., Personality Characteristics of “Self-Martyrs”/”Suicide Bombers” and 
Organizers of Suicide Attacks, 22 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 87, 95 (2009). 
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not attempt to activate the device.46 Although based upon a small sample, 
the striking result is that the more committed an attacker was to complet-
ing the mission, the less likely he was to possess the qualities that mental 
illness advocates argue to be the sine qua non of the category. 
If attackers are not driven by a perverse desire for self-extinction, 
the motivation must lie elsewhere. Raphael Israeli has suggested that be-
cause suicide bombers lack the endogenous risk factors commonly asso-
ciated with suicide, social factors prove determinative.47 As Marc Sage-
man pointed out, “social bonds play a more important role in the 
emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology.”48 The importance of 
social relationships over ideology had been identified earlier when 
Franco Ferracuti reported that, in “terms of family background, [he] was 
unable to distinguish among [Italian youths] those who became political 
activists, those who became terrorists, those who joined a youth gang, 
and those who entered the drug culture. The main determinant was who 
one’s friends were.”49 
This dynamic has been more recently highlighted by Scott Atran’s 
work among terrorist networks. “The Hamburg group [behind the 9/11 
attacks] wasn’t recruited or brainwashed. Like most Jihadi groups, it self-
radicalized and then went looking for action. It was actually a fluid, con-
stantly evolving network of friends and fellow travelers in search of mak-
ing sense of their lives and the world.”50 He goes on to say, “People, in-
cluding terrorists, don’t simply die for a cause; they die for each other, 
especially their friends.”51 In fact, three of every four people who join 
jihad groups “do so with friends.”52 
The suggestion that suicide terrorists are driven by their ties to a 
network of intimate relationships offers a starting point to consider more 
deeply what moves them to such extreme and personally destructive ac-
tions. 
 
 46. MERARI, supra note 33, at 142. 
 47. Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze and Their Significance, 9 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 
96, 97, 105 (1997). 
 48. MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 178 (2004). 
 49. POST, supra note 35, at 60. 
 50. ATRAN, supra note 40, at 108. 
 51. Id. at 479. See also JULIE CHERNOV HWANG, WHY TERRORISTS QUIT: THE 
DISENGAGEMENT OF INDONESIAN JIHADISTS 66 (2018). 
 52. Scott Atran, The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict 
Across Cultures, 57 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, S192, S199 (2016). 
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IV.  SUICIDE TERRORISTS’ MOTIVATION: SIGNIFICANCE QUEST THEORY 
The “Significance Quest Theory” (SQT) from Arie Kruglanski and 
his colleagues offers one of the literature’s better developed explanatory 
models for terrorism. The theory builds upon initial premises we can ac-
cept as uncontroversial: 
[1] “like other behaviors, terrorists’ behavior is goal driven and 
[terrorism] constitutes the means through which individuals 
choose to pursue their goal”; and [2] “this self-regulatory pro-
cess of goal pursuit is carried out against a backdrop of cultural 
meanings that determine what goals are worthy of pursuit and 
what means are effective and legitimate for that purpose.”53 
Granting those premises, the laundry list of possible motives found 
in the literature for terrorism are not competing and contradictory expla-
nations, but rather different expressions of “a more general motivational 
rubric, the quest for significance.”54 
Although Kruglanski had first attempted to explain suicide terrorism 
as a kind of adolescent testosterone-fueled rebellion shaped by organiza-
tional agents,55 he later shifted to the description of death anxiety offered 
by Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death. Becker’s insight was that our 
biological viability, both as a species and as individuals, depends upon 
adequately coping with the awareness of personal mortality which is both 
inevitable and stultifying. We are beings who have 
a mind that soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who 
can place himself imaginatively at a point in space and contem-
plate bemusedly his own planet. This immense expansion, this 
dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives to man 
literally the status of a small god in nature. . . [Y]et, at the same 
time . . . [that power of imagination reveals that] man is a worm 
and food for worms.56 
The contradiction between the inspiration to strive and the aware-
ness that all such striving is ultimately pointless results in a state of 
 
 53. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Terrorism as Means to an End: How Political Violence Bestows 
Significance, in MEANING, MORTALITY, AND CHOICE: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EXISTENTIAL 
CONCERNS 203, 206-07 (Phillip R. Shaver et al. eds., 2012). 
 54. Id. at 207. See also Katarzyna Jasco et al., Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism: 
The Case of Domestic Radicalization, 38 POL. PSYCH. 815, 817-18 (2017); Michelle Dugas & Arie 
W. Kruglanski, The Quest for Significance Model of Radicalization: Implications for the Manage-
ment of Terrorist Detainees, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 423, 424-29 (2014). 
 55. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organisational 
Strategies in Suicide Terrorism, 3 J. POLICING, INTEL. & COUNTER TERRORISM 70 (2008). 
 56. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (1973). 
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existential paralysis. To cope with this paradox, humans devise tech-
niques to assign symbolic meaning to our objectively meaningless exist-
ence. For some, the belief in personal significance can include participa-
tion in dramatic clashes in defense of matters of cosmic importance, or 
deeds that will make one esteemed in the eyes of valued others. From this 
process, Kruglanski extracts the insight that “the underlying force to 
which we attribute the appeal of extreme behavior [lies in] the basic hu-
man desire to matter and have meaning in one’s life.”57 Resorting to vio-
lent, suicidal terrorist attacks are merely the actor’s quest to assign sig-
nificance to their existence. Considerable empirical evidence supports the 
predicted relationships derived from this theory.58 In the main, it works. 
As SQT developed, however, this existential emphasis faded from 
prominence. Perhaps not coincidentally, and despite the theory’s begin-
nings, Kruglanski eventually concedes that SQT is not uniquely tailored 
to the problem of suicide terrorism: “the motivations involved in suicidal 
and nonsuicidal types of terrorism may differ in degree rather than in 
kind.”59 Most of his later writings focus on terrorism more broadly with-
out offering special insight into suicide terrorism, arguably under the as-
sumption that by shedding light on the former, we indirectly learn some-
thing about the latter. 
Contrary to Kruglanski’s stance on this point, other writers have 
concluded that general terrorism and suicide terrorism are “significantly 
different. . . . [We] should not expect the same factors to account equally 
well for suicide and nonsuicide terrorism.”60 Returning to Merari’s com-
parative study, we find evidence for this nonequivalence. Would-be sui-
cides were found to have a significantly different psychological profile 
from attack organizers,61 a result that appears to contradict the expectation 
that these persons exist on the same continuum of functional attributes. 
Each position—suicide terrorism as a subtype of terrorism, and sui-
cide terrorism as qualitatively distinct—has empirical support. The case 
may be that both are true, at least in their proper domains. Yet even if 
suicide terrorism overlaps with terrorism, there will still be a residuum of 
an unknown degree that cannot be accounted for by a theory such as SQT, 
which intends to describe what the two behaviors have in common. A 
 
 57. Arie Kruglanski et al., The Making of Violent Extremists, 22 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 107 
(2018). 
 58. See Arie W. Kruglanski et al., The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: 
How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism, 35 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 69 (2014). 
 59. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest 
for Personal Significance, 30 POL. PSYCH. 331, 337 (2009). 
 60. PAPE, supra note 28, at 9. 
 61. MERARI, supra note 33, at 151. 
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different theory would be needed to deal with the aspect of suicide ter-
rorism that is not subsumed within terrorism generally. 
The best reading of the data, therefore, suggests that, although shar-
ing many traits, suicide terrorists and general terrorists will diverge on 
only the characteristics thought to be critical to leading the former into 
self-extinguishing actions. Fuller explanation beyond the quest for signif-
icance would then be needed to explain the unique aspects of the suicide 
terrorist. An alternative candidate has placed at its heart the part of 
Becker’s existential psychology that SQT declined to fully follow: death 
anxiety. 
V.  SUICIDE TERRORISTS’ MOTIVATION, REVISED: TERROR MANAGEMENT 
THEORY 
For a variety of reasons, SQT fails to fully account for suicide ter-
rorism. While criticisms of SQT exist,62 for present purposes, the larger 
obstacles can be tied to the way in which the theory develops and diverges 
from its original source material. As discussed below, minor adjustments 
of emphasis can result in significant improvements in theoretical out-
comes that lead to a clearer understanding of suicide terrorism. 
Becker’s work gave rise to a theory, other than SQT, that built upon 
the same problem of death awareness. While SQT attends to the problem 
of meaninglessness by highlighting the immediate work to generate per-
sonal significance, Terror Management Theory (TMT) takes a more ex-
pansive view that considers in deeper detail which accomplishments will 
in fact be recognized as significant.63 
Becker explained that knowledge of our inevitable end creates the 
problem of personal meaninglessness. He goes on to describe how the 
paradox is resolved by cultural institutions that teach us how to escape 
that tragic insignificance. Symbolic culture provides a shared template to 
negate the pitiless lessons of the physical world. Death denial can take 
various forms, from a belief in literal immortality via a soul-survival cult, 
to the extension of the self beyond our material, doomed shell to be pre-
served through proxies such as children, religions, group affiliations, or 
national allegiance. The major difference between SQT and TMT is that 
for TMT the substitute must be validated by the group to be effective; the 
 
 62. Mia Bloom, Chasing Butterflies and Rainbows: A Critique of Kruglanski et al.’s “Fully 
Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance,” 30 POL. 
PSYCH. 387 (2009). 
 63. Mark J. Landau et al., A Function of Form: Terror Management and Structuring the Social 
World, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 190 (2004). 
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project of immortality is not a task for the private individual, contrary to 
what SQT suggests in its emphasis on the quest for personal significance. 
The result is a more comprehensive theoretical foundation for TMT: 
[H]umans all manage the problem of knowing we are mortal by 
calling on two basic psychological resources. First, we need to 
sustain faith in our cultural worldview, which imbues our sense 
of reality with order, meaning, and permanence . . . . 
But we don’t just need to view life in general this way; we need to 
view our own life this way. The paths to literal and symbolic immortality 
laid out by our worldviews require us to feel that we are valuable mem-
bers of our cultures. Hence, the second vital resource for managing terror 
is a feeling of personal significance, commonly known as self-esteem.64 
While SQT can shed light on the problem of terrorism, the more 
complete model of TMT is required to explain suicide terrorism—one in 
which SQT should be seen as a special and thus, more limited case. Alt-
hough overlap exists between the two theories as a result of their shared 
intellectual genealogy from Becker, SQT’s emphasis on TMT’s self-es-
teem prong yields a theory of terrorism that focuses on personal psychol-
ogy, as it isolates the “need for closure” as the critical element leading to 
violent extremism.65 By contrast, while also incorporating self-esteem 
concerns, TMT embeds them within group institutions—making it at its 
core a theory of culture. Although these are nuanced distinctions, the 
broad claim here is that despite speaking in the same vocabulary of death 
anxiety, TMT and SQT focus on different explanatory facets of the same 
problem of suicide terrorism. While SQT may suffice to account for ter-
rorism, of which suicide terrorism becomes a subspecies, TMT is neces-
sary to understand the aspects of suicide terrorism that are not reducible 
to self-esteem. TMT is able to do this because it begins with the prior 
need to annul death anxiety. 
Although the idea of culture built into TMT remains a challenging 
concept for many social scientists,66 the term references an important 
frame through which a wide range of existential problems can be ap-
proached. Culture offers ready-made, easily understood solutions to the 
 
 64. SHELDON SOLOMON ET AL., THE WORM AT THE CORE: ON THE ROLE OF DEATH IN LIFE 
9 (2015). 
 65. David Weber et al., The Road to Extremism: Field and Experimental Evidence that Sig-
nificance Loss-Induced Need for Closure Fosters Radicalization, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 270 (2018). 
 66. DAVID BERLINER, LOSING CULTURE: NOSTALGIA, HERITAGE, AND OUR ACCELERATED 
TIMES 97 (Dominic Horsfall trans. 2020) (“[I]n this era of globalization and transnational move-
ments, it is problematic to speak of cultures, in the sense of clearly outlined entities with well-
defined contours, attached to a specific territory and language.”). 
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most common difficulties confronting a social entity mired in an existen-
tial paradox. When remedies are shared, they demand less psychological 
effort to maintain correct explanations of how the world works and where 
death-defying meaning is read. 
Once internalized, these solutions become the raw material out of 
which personal identity is then forged. As explained in one classic eth-
nography, 
being a Tahitian is having a “Tahitian mind,” operating with as-
sumptions and motives which have been shaped by various as-
pects of growing up and of everyday life in Tahitian communi-
ties. People act in a Tahitian way and “conform” to 
Tahitian culture because it is the natural thing for them to do.67 
As with the Tahitians, so for us all. Culture tells us who we are, 
directs us how to behave, and teaches us what matters. To lose this basis 
of self-identity, and to have “slipped out of the warm embrace of a culture 
into the cold air of a fragmentary existence,”68 can result in the disinte-
gration of mental health. The inability to rely upon cultural resources to 
bolster identity is known to increase rates of suicide,69 or at least under-
mine the will to survive.70 
Because most people will not experience the loss of their own cul-
ture, the process can be best illustrated through the way anthropologists 
undergo a lesser version of this break during their fieldwork. Alone in an 
unfamiliar environment, struggling in a foreign tongue to forge intimate 
bonds by assuming the role of a child who must be taught even the most 
simple social norms, the student “loses his sense of self-esteem and self-
worth reflected back from others… ‘One’s concept of self disintegrates 
because the accustomed responses have disappeared.’”71 Formerly reflex-
ive modes of social interaction are now exhausting and intense efforts 
requiring the fledgling anthropologist to consciously navigate each situ-
ation. Culture shock, even in such small and relatively temporary 
 
 67. ROBERT I. LEVY, TAHITIANS: MIND AND EXPERIENCE IN THE SOCIETY ISLANDS 326 
(1973). 
 68. EDWARD SAPIR, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 97 
(1966). 
 69. Antoon A. Leenaars et al., Genocide and Suicide Among Indigenous People: The North 
Meets the South, 19 CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 337 (1999). 
 70. SVEN LINDQVIST, “EXTERMINATE ALL THE BRUTES”: ONE MAN’S ODYSSEY INTO THE 
HEART OF DARKNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN GENOCIDE 143 (Joan Tate trans., The New 
Press 1997). 
 71. JOHN L. WENGLE, ETHNOGRAPHERS IN THE FIELD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RESEARCH 9 
(1988) (quoting Ruth Landes). 
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circumstances as these, “leans toward the view that, for the individual, 
the loss of his sense of identity is a symbolic death.”72 
Given the essential role of culture in creating personality, the hy-
pothesis offered here is that a fresh understanding of suicide terrorism 
will come from looking broadly at the defense of the cultural institutions 
that define what makes the actor feel significant.73 These norms charter 
the rules for symbolic immortality— the ultimate end purchased through 
the coin of notoriety and significance. The suicide terrorist operates, in 
Scott Atran’s words, using a logic of appropriateness, not a logic of con-
sequences.74 In other words, actions, even when they may make little 
sense in terms of the strategic objectives that are likely to be achieved or 
the immediate personal benefit such as renown as a martyr for the cause, 
can still make perfect sense under TMT when the goal is to define oneself 
by defending the master paradigm through which one can escape the 
death paradox.75 SQT operates when this more fundamental dilemma is 
already resolved or taken for granted. 
Given the role that cultural values play in the definition of the self, 
TMT expects “that the mere existence of another [cultural worldview] 
destabilizes one’s own worldview, and by doing so it reduces its buffer-
function.”76 TMT thus anticipates increased anxiety when alternative ex-
istential solutions exist side-by-side, but more so when the worldview 
employed to build self-esteem is under direct attack, which contributes to 
a “lethal cocktail that encourages violence.”77 
The resulting sequelae would be unexpected by SQT. “TMT can ex-
plain the motivation behind terrorist acts, and why individuals have the 
propensity to inflict destruction and death upon innocent victims, simply 
because they do not share common religious, political, or cultural views,” 
an action that bears no direct benefit if the goal is to increase personal 
significance.78 Moreover, SQT problematizes “radicalization” under the 
 
 72. Id. at 10. 
 73. The assumption for this position is that suicide bombers possess higher levels of death 
anxiety than the general population, or even other, nonsuicidal terrorists. 
 74. ATRAN, supra note 40, at 393. 
 75. Jeremy Ginges et al., Sacred Bounds on Rational Resolution of Violent Political Conflict, 
104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 7357, 7359 (2007). 
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Pride and Prejudice: Fear of Death and Social Behavior, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 
200, 201 (2000). 
 77. Tom Pyszczynski et al., Righteous Violence: Killing for God, Country, Freedom and Jus-
tice, 1 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 12, 15 (2009). 
 78. Miliaikeala Heen et al., Terror Management, Crime, and Law, in DENYING DEATH: AN 
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apparent premise that beliefs are not to be taken seriously, and that those 
who treat them as Tillich’s “ultimate concern[s]”79 are somehow unbal-
anced. TMT, in contrast, predicts that such convictions are at the center 
of everyone’s personality, and that to preserve them, a person will strive 
to reinforce the cultural worldviews, perhaps, as Becker noted, by seeking 
or forcing conversions: “[P]eople try so hard to win converts for their 
point of view because it is more than merely an outlook on life: it is an 
immortality formula”80 whose validity grows when there are fewer op-
posing viewpoints. 
From this perspective, deeds to defend one’s mechanism for proxy 
immortality are literal acts of self-preservation, up to and including the 
death of the physical body which is doomed in any case. The paradoxical 
result, as Kruglanski has noted, is that “[T]he willingness to die in an act 
of suicide terrorism may be motivated by the desire to live forever,”81 a 
hypothesis that has received some on-point experimental verification.82 
All of the different motivations offered by other scholars to explain sui-
cide terrorism are thereby reducible to either triggers for existential anx-
iety about the threats to one’s cultural lifeboat or immersion in the net-
work of relationships that signify the greater whole as a defense against 
perceived dangers. 
VI.  THE ATTACK ON LOCAL IMMORTALITY FORMULAS: FORCED 
CONVERSION TO GLOBAL CONSUMER CAPITALISM 
The shift from SQT to TMT may seem like a small change. How-
ever, TMT promises to be more theoretically productive because it con-
tains explanatory power beyond what can be achieved by focusing solely 
on the individual’s quest for personal significance. For example, TMT, 
but not SQT, can accommodate the finding that those with prior religious 
commitments were less vulnerable to “militant interpretations of Islam 
that allow self-bombing” than those who were “Islamic in name only,”83 
because the former already have “a base philosophy which is likely to 
 
 79. PAUL TILLICH, THE ESSENTIAL TILLICH: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WRITINGS OF PAUL 
TILLICH 33 (1987). 
 80. BECKER, supra note 56, at 255. 
 81. KRUGLANSKI, supra note 59, at 336. 
 82. Clay Routledge & Jamie Arndt, Self-Sacrifice as Self-Defence: Mortality Salience In-
creases Efforts to Affirm a Symbolic Immortal Self at the Expense of the Physical Self, 38 EUR. J. 
SOC. PSYCH. 531 (2008). 
 83. Khapta Akhmedova & Anne Speckhard, A Multi-Causal Analysis of the Genesis of Sui-
cide Terrorism: The Chechen Case, in TANGLED ROOTS: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
IN THE GENESIS OF TERRORISM 324 (Jeff Victoroff ed., 2006). 
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offer some psychological buffer and protection to deal with death and 
other serious traumatic events.”84 
This Part further illustrates the productivity of TMT by examining 
a significant problem about which SQT has had little to say: how do we 
account for the historical fact that while terrorism has a long modern his-
tory, suicide attacks did not appear until the early 1980s, and when they 
did appear, they were very irregular across the map? Even allowing that 
suicide terrorism was not a feasible strategy until the development of ap-
propriate explosives and trigger mechanisms, there remains a discrep-
ancy. If the two forms of violence—terrorism and suicide terrorism—are 
expressions of the same psychological motives, we should expect the lat-
ter tactic to be utilized as soon as the tools become available, and in any 
place that was already experiencing terrorist attacks. Yet this expectation 
is not supported by historical patterns. 
 The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) maintains a database of terrorist incidents across 
the globe from 1970 to present.85 The criteria for inclusion is broader than 
discussed earlier, and does not limit or code its events for the targeting of 
noncombatants. However, the general thrust of the trends remains useful 
for present purposes. Only the time period from 1981—the Lebanon sui-
cide attack of that year was the “first major contemporary suicide at-
tack”86—through 2018 is presented here. Initial consideration has been 
limited to eleven focal countries with some of the heaviest attacks of su-
icide terrorism. Table 1 reports the incidents of suicide [Sui] relative to 
nonsuicide [NSui] terrorism. 
Table 1: Annual Suicide and Non-Suicide Terrorist Attacks  
 Egypt India Israel Lebanon Nigeria Pakistan 
 Nsui Sui Nsui Sui Nsui Sui Nsui Sui Nsui Sui Nsui Sui 
1981 9 0 16 0 36 0 80 1 0 0 4 0 
1982 1 0 13 0 71 0 119 1 0 0 4 0 
1983 0 0 47 0 31 0 230 4 3 0 9 0 
1984 0 0 159 0 25 0 164 2 0 0 3 0 
1985 2 0 39 0 19 1 80 15 0 0 2 0 
1986 4 0 96 0 48 0 103 3 0 0 24 0 
 
 84. Anne Speckhard & Khapta Akhmedova, Black Widows and Beyond: Understanding the 
Motivations and Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists, in FEMALE TERRORISM 
AND MILITANCY: AGENCY, UTILITY, AND ORGANIZATION 100, 109 (Cindy Ness ed., 2008). 
 85. Global Terrorism Database, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
 86. ATRAN, supra note 38, at 1. 
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1987 7 0 166 0 23 0 92 2 0 0 60 0 
1988 9 0 358 0 35 0 123 2 2 0 44 0 
1989 7 0 324 0 86 1 141 0 0 0 45 0 
1990 13 0 339 0 98 0 83 1 0 0 87 0 
1991 10 0 338 1 64 0 91 0 3 0 150 0 
1992 79 0 237 0 78 0 91 0 11 0 85 0 
1993 49 1 42 0 21 1 36 1 0 0 8 0 
1994 143 0 107 0 51 4 67 0 8 0 154 0 
1995 102 0 179 0 11 2 38 0 1 0 664 2 
1996 51 0 213 0 14 5 38 1 11 0 180 0 
1997 22 0 193 0 11 2 45 1 20 0 206 0 
1998 3 0 59 2 13 1 22 1 2 0 36 1 
1999 1 0 111 1 6 2 41 1 18 0 39 0 
2000 0 0 179 1 15 0 12 0 6 0 49 0 
2001 0 0 228 6 54 25 5 0 5 0 53 0 
2002 0 0 180 4 30 45 8 0 6 0 44 2 
2003 0 0 193 3 20 18 5 0 9 0 26 3 
2004 0 3 106 2 12 7 1 0 6 0 62 5 
2005 0 2 143 3 38 5 17 0 9 0 72 5 
2006 5 0 165 2 77 4 7 1 37 0 157 7 
2007 0 0 146 3 52 1 17 1 61 0 202 58 
2008 1 0 528 6 131 3 57 1 76 0 531 37 
2009 2 0 671 1 36 0 14 0 42 0 620 47 
2010 2 0 663 0 13 1 5 0 63 0 679 34 
2011 16 2 645 0 50 1 10 0 171 4 969 43 
2012 49 0 610 1 64 1 15 0 580 36 1602 52 
2013 312 9 691 3 37 0 115 6 342 4 2135 80 
2014 349 5 859 1 293 0 191 13 674 40 2108 43 
2015 631 16 878 6 58 0 40 4 511 127 1213 30 
2016 367 9 1017 8 49 1 39 2 479 54 2016 31 
2017 208 16 960 6 32 0 21 2 360 124 688 31 
2018 53 6 888 2 63 0 7 0 645 60 480 25 
Totals 2507 69 12786 62 1865 131 2270 66 4161 449 15510 536 
 
 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:45 PM 
20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
Table 1 (cont.): Annual Suicide and Non-Suicide Terrorist Attacks 
 Russia Somalia Sri Lanka Turkey Yemen 















8 0 2 0 8 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 
1983 1 0 7 0 5 0 0 0 
1984 2 0 81 0 19 0 0 0 
1985 0 0 110 0 2 0 0 0 
1986 0 0 142 0 7 0 0 0 
1987 1 0 114 1 43 0 0 0 
1988 2 0 350 0 42 0 0 0 
1989 2 0 510 0 114 0 0 0 
1990 12 0 140 1 195 0 0 0 
1991 8 0 113 2 293 0 5 0 
1992 21 0 21 0 102 1 514 0 24 0 
1993 4 0 23 0 7 2 29 0 6 0 
1994 47 0 57 0 32 3 300 0 19 0 
1995 37 0 13 0 115 11 133 0 8 0 
1996 66 0 16 0 170 6 51 3 8 0 
1997 77 0 19 0 59 5 44 0 19 0 
1998 26 0 1 0 26 9 20 3 7 0 
1999 54 0 4 0 35 11 98 11 17 0 
2000 128 10 9 0 52 16 34 1 8 2 
2001 133 2 5 0 30 6 17 2 7 0 
2002 86 3 3 0 3 0 5 0 7 0 
2003 66 10 1 0 8 1 14 5 7 0 
2004 36 8 1 0 32 1 26 1 0 0 
2005 64 0 6 0 133 0 40 1 7 0 
2006 54 2 8 2 208 7 41 2 4 1 
2007 49 2 153 3 126 6 29 0 6 1 
2008 169 1 169 3 87 13 31 1 20 2 
2009 147 5 120 2 25 12 12 1 21 2 
2010 240 11 126 4 3 0 20 0 105 7 
2011 182 6 177 8 0 0 49 2 111 7 
2012 143 8 308 17 4 0 185 3 276 36 
2013 135 9 325 17 14 0 41 1 405 20 
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2014 47 1 848 24 16 0 93 1 726 37 
2015 21 0 393 25 11 0 417 5 627 37 
2016 51 4 562 40 1 0 518 24 472 53 
2017 29 4 571 43 41 0 172 9 211 15 
2018 23 4 527 30 7 0 94 0 325 5 
Totals 2135 90 4502 218 2918 114 3760 76 3458 225 
Comparing the national statistics reveals first that suicide attacks are 
never a preferred strategy, and rarely account for more than ten percent, 
typically much less, of the total terrorist attacks experienced by a country. 
More immediately relevant is the observation that suicide attacks do not 
begin to appear across nations at the same time, suggesting that their ap-
pearance is not a function of technological feasibility. For example, Leb-
anon was experiencing suicide attacks in the early 1980s, but they were 
not seen in Pakistan, despite a similar history of general terrorism, until 
the mid-1990s. 
 This irregularity is not accidental. Taking the wider view, Dechesne 
and Bandt-Law find enough consistency to argue that suicide terrorism 
arose in roughly four clusters across different periods and locations.87 If 
the resort to suicide attacks is therefore not dependent upon technology, 
what changes prompted the uneven resort to this new form of armed re-
sistance? 
In answering this question, we note that although the colonial era 
had largely passed by the 1980s, the structural relationships it birthed 
have arguably been preserved with new economies that track the market 
domination of the Western powers. In other words, “the neo-colonialism 
of multi-national corporations is only the latest, most sophisticated form 
of indirect rule” that had typified the British empire.88 While many schol-
ars study these developments from political or economic perspectives, 
Erich Fromm has argued that they also have a psychological impact: 
Fromm argued that the more modernity advances, the smaller 
you feel. This is due to having lost touch with all the original 
“medieval ties” – clan, tribe, sect, guild, extended family, neigh-
bourhood, etc. – that formed the premodern basis of personal 
identity. Modernity then has given birth to the individual while 
leaving him (or her) defenceless, alone and alienated against his 
opposite, society . . . . Thus the “individual overcomes the feel-
ing of insignificance in comparison with the overwhelming 
 
 87. Dechesne & Brandt-Law, supra note 25, at 146. 
 88. Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency 
System in India (1764-1858), 18 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 393, 395 (1984). 
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power of the world outside of himself either by renouncing his 
individual integrity, or by destroying others so that the world 
ceases to be threatening.”89 
In order to apply this insight, we need additional details on how this 
disruptive modernity was introduced into the impacted societies. The vec-
tor considered here is the spread of consumer capitalism. Developing so-
cieties, which often did not share the individualist consumer mentality 
upon which capitalist enterprises depend, nonetheless “were forced by 
financial pressures and international institutions to conform to the domi-
nant American model of capitalism.”90 This policy, even when generating 
material benefits, on the whole resulted in a deterioration of local condi-
tions. 
Prior studies have shown that neither corporate globalization,91 nor 
economic development,92 is sufficient by itself to give rise to terrorist in-
cidents within a country’s borders. To achieve those economic goals in 
the developing markets, though, the worldviews of the subject population 
must be manipulated.93 This usurpation of the indigenous worldview, to 
be replaced with one radically different, one favoring transplanted market 
values, threatens an existential crisis. This process could explain the un-
even introduction of suicide attacks. 
Capitalism thrives not simply by making its goods available to new 
customers, but by aggressive advertising to create the perceived need for 
those goods. While early advertisements focused on the product’s 
straightforward description and attributes,94 by the 1920s marketing had 
shifted focus to new needs and insecurities that the offered products 
promised to fill.95 Advertising “helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with 
their mode of life, discontented with the ugly things around them. Satis-
fied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones.”96 As the classic 
 
 89. Aysha, supra note 32, at 85-86. 
 90. JAMES FULCHER, CAPITALISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 98-99 (2nd ed. 2015). 
 91. Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A 
Pooled Timed-Series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 254 (2004). 
 92. Martin Gassebner & Simon Luechinger, Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A Comprehensive As-
sessment of the Determinants of Terror, 149 PUB. CHOICE 235, 254 (2011). 
 93. See generally JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF 
CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA (2012) (describing a study of changes that the rise of the cap-
italist economy provoked in the self-understanding of the individual, especially in the context of 
responsibility for ultimate economic success). 
 94. Monica Brasted, The Values of the Consumer Culture: Reflected in the Advertisements 
of “The Saturday Evening Post”: 1900-1929 70 (2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity) (on file with the Pennsylvania State University system). 
 95. WINSTON FLETCHER, ADVERTISING: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 99 (2010). 
 96. STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS 
OF CONSUMER CULTURE 39 (1976). 
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sociological study Middletown recounts, advertising since the turn of the 
century concentrated “increasingly upon a type of copy aiming to make 
the reader emotionally uneasy, to bludgeon him with the fact that decent 
people don’t live the way he does.”97 Famous examples of creating inse-
curities to sell merchandise include the histories of antiperspirants98 and 
mouthwash.99 Consequently, 
[a] major outcome of globally mediated promises of a good life 
has been that people around the world perceive their immediate 
lifeworld as worthless and hopeless. As a consequence, “glob-
alization is by many people primarily experienced in its absence, 
in the form of the non-arrival of change, unfulfilled promises 
and aspirations rather than in an actual increase of mobility or 
flux of goods.”100 
Cast in the terms of the present argument, for capitalism to succeed 
it must not only undermine the self-esteem prong of TMT, but also sub-
stitute itself as a competing view of the standards by which consumers 
will adjudge themselves to be significant.101 
Consumer values serve to assign meaning and significance to the 
individual’s existence, and in that way emerge as a competing culturally 
fostered solution to the death paradox. In this context, Becker specifically 
analyzed money as the “new universal immortality ideology.”102 Gold and 
money has become, he says, the immortality symbol for the West.103 Ten-
nessee Williams described the relationship this way: 
The human animal is a beast that dies and if he’s got money he 
buys and buys and buys and I think the reason he buys 
 
 97. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRILL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 82 (1929). 
 98. Sarah Everts, How Advertisers Convinced Americans They Smelled Bad, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-advertisers-convinced-amer-
icans-they-smelled-bad-12552404/. 
 99. Laura Clark, How Halitosis Became a Medical Condition With a “Cure”, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/marketing-campaign-in-
vented-halitosis-180954082/. 
 100. JOSKA SAMULI SCHIELKE, EGYPT IN THE FUTURE TENSE: HOPE FRUSTRATION, AND 
AMBIVALENCE BEFORE AND AFTER 2011 35 (2015) (quoting Knut Graw). 
 101. Brasted, supra note 94, at 31 (“The consumer revolution is now seen to have changed the 
Western concepts of time, space, society, the individual, family and state. The meanings carried by 
goods resocialize “the people,” change their concepts of themselves, their concepts of society and 
most of all their social aspirations by changing their concept of consumption and consumer 
goods.”). 
 102. ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL 73-90 (1975). 
 103. Id. at 74; Tyler F. Stillman & Lindsey A. Harvell, Marketing, Money, and Mortality, in 
DENYING DEATH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY 84, 
84-85 (Lindsey A. Harvell & Gwendelyn S. Nisbett eds., 2016). 
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everything he can buy is that in the back of his mind he has the 
crazy hope that one of his purchases will be life everlasting.104 
The rise of this new significance strategy inevitably sparks compe-
tition with prior worldviews. But whereas traditional religions tend to be 
anxiety-reducing institutions, capitalism thrives by creating anxiety, not 
alleviating it. That reversal makes it an exceptionally poor replacement 
for the prior death anxiety solutions.   
Even in the United States, where one might expect the hedonic ben-
efits of material consumption to be the most plainly visible, one finds the 
opposite. Excessive choices arising from material abundance cumula-
tively cause distress that results from “regret, concern about status, adap-
tation, social comparison, and perhaps most important, the desire to have 
the best of everything—to maximize.”105 This “tyranny of small deci-
sions,”106 which has been shown to “contribute to the recent epidemic of 
clinical depression affecting much of the Western world,”107 is embedded 
in a broader context wherein the necessity of material acquisition serves 
as the means to social acceptability, leading Americans to feel the perpet-
ual humiliation of never having enough.108 
As a result, about 20% of adults in the United States suffer from a 
mental illness, and for 4.6% of adults these issues are serious.109 In one 
comparative study, the 26.4% of Americans who have experienced any 
of the recorded Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
[fourth edition (DSM-IV)] illnesses in the last twelve months ranked the 
highest out of fourteen countries.110 We have seen increased psycho-
pathology among college students,111 with the suicide rate among younger 
Americans increasing dramatically from 1999 to 2017.112 
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These outcomes are unsurprising when viewed against the change 
in United States’ commercial morality from the 1920s, when the patent 
for the isolation of human insulin was transferred for the public good for 
a token $1.00. In the present day, United States’ drug company CEOs 
raise the costs of their medicines enormously in the belief that, “it is a 
moral requirement to make money when you can.”113 Under the push of 
advertising, in sum, the last hundred years has seen our cultural emphasis 
shift from ideals of intrinsic virtues to those of extrinsic materialism. 
All told, to the extent that “people have adopted the ‘American 
dream’ of stuffing their pockets, they seem to that extent to be emptier of 
self and soul.”114 It is important to note that this outcome is not because 
consumer capitalism has been abused or poorly implemented. The nega-
tive effects flow from the way that capitalism necessarily operates. Cap-
italism by definition creates desires that can never be satisfied: 
This is the genius of the capitalist process: by actually providing 
goods and gratifications on the condition of constant growth, 
capitalism constantly raises expectations, undermines lives and 
livelihoods that once were safe and certain, and creates pres-
sures and promises that once would have been unimaginable. 
These pressures are troublesome even under conditions of rela-
tive wealth.115 
The last point is striking. To argue, as some do, that the system 
“works” because poor people are better off than poor people were a hun-
dred years ago116 misses the point, because life satisfaction is not a simple 
function of what a person has, but also what he has relative to others.117 
As Marx had earlier noted, as societies become wealthier, people redefine 
what subsistence means.118 Because the standards necessarily recede be-
yond reach, the new religion of wealth, in the end, does not and inherently 
cannot perform adequately as a death paradox-mitigating worldview. 
 
 113. Jessie Hellmann, Drug Company CEO Calls 400 Percent Price Hike ‘Moral Require-
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DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1966) (explaining an early work on 
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Despite these significant negative consequences, and because capi-
talism must expand into new markets to survive, this failed worldview is 
aggressively imposed across the globe because of the one dimension on 
which capitalism does perform well—raw monetary benefits. Market 
capitalism is backed by massive military and economic coercive power 
to the detriment of the traditional institutions that offered more effective 
solutions to the death paradox. Thus, market capitalism has been intro-
duced into cultural environments that did not contain the elemental pre-
cursors that would have made it less of an alien intrusion. The result has 
been a transition from a society of communally-based independent pro-
ducers into one of individualistic passive consumers, a change that has 
proved traumatic even for Americans.119 
It is in this sense that one may view the incursion of capitalist values 
as a forced religious conversion120 that some may not happily endure, 
leading in some instances to dramatic blowback. This is the background 
against which the differential appearance of suicide terrorism becomes 
comprehensible. The exportation of American values of “relentless con-
sumerism, atomized societies, the interpretation of freedom as no rules 
and no responsibility, and glorification of vulgarity and violence in film 
and music” which “steal[] the identity of the oppressed,” offers nothing 
but “a new colonial system”121 that creates a “source of potential humili-
ation and worldview threat that could increase the appeal of radical Is-
lamist movements.”122 
According to Atran once said the following, “Violent extremism 
represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures but their collapse as 
young people unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search 
of a social identity that gives personal significance and glory. This is the 
dark side of globalization.”123 
 Here, he restates an observation first recorded by Hoffer almost sev-
enty years earlier: “The discontent generated in backward [sic] countries 
by their contact with Western civilization is not primarily resentment 
against exploitation by domineering foreigners. It is rather the result of a 
crumbling or weakening of tribal solidarity and communal life.”124 The 
new element to be considered is how cultural factors may have shaped 
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FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:45 PM 
2021] Theories Grounding Suicide Terrorism 27 
the acceptable form of suicide in some Middle Eastern societies.125 In the 
face of foreign values that contradict the local death-denying mores, “If 
one is chronically unsuccessful at convincing oneself of the inferior na-
ture of the competing [cultural worldview], a more grim, final solution, 
as so many terrorist fascists have concluded, is simply to obliterate the 
offending presence.”126 TMT thus predicts what SQT cannot: 
[C]onfidence in a particular worldview can be restored by anni-
hilating those who do not share that view, thus proving conclu-
sively that the victor must have been right after all. From this 
perspective, then, prejudice (and the violent conflicts that often 
result from it) can be understood, at least in part, as an inevitable 
consequence of competition between death-denying cosmolog-
ical visions.127 
The hypothesis here is that pressure on existing worldviews in 
places into which the West has prematurely introduced a capitalistic 
mindset began to reach a cultural tipping point in the years leading up to 
the 1980s. The empirically observed differential resort to suicide terror-
ism is therefore a function of the timing of the full brunt of capitalist in-
sertion and the degree to which Western-style consumerism has under-
mined the local techniques for death denial. For resistors, the choice 
becomes either to capitulate to the new worldview that is demonstrably 
inferior in terms of resolving the death paradox, thereby leading to patho-
logical anxieties, or to aggressively reassert and defend the old lifeways 
that let one feel that life is meaningful. In this confluence of competing 
cultural forces, suicide attacks whereby actors seek to preserve their im-
mortality, rather than their lives, become a comprehensible strategy. 
VII.  EGYPTIAN CASE STUDY 
A look at the rise of suicide terrorism in Egypt provides initial real-
world support for the proposed relationship between suicide attacks and 
the disruptive influence of Western market values upon traditional socie-
ties. 
 
 125. In this light, suicide terrorism may also be viewed as a form of culture-bound syndrome, 
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Table 1 shows that while Egypt has had an extensive history of ter-
rorist attacks, the first use of suicide terrorism did not occur until 1993. 
In contrast, Lebanon experienced suicide attacks beginning in at least 
1981. As argued, that twelve-year lag suggests that technological innova-
tion is not the spark that drives the method’s appearance. An alternative 
explanation emerges from the observation that in both cases, the terrorist 
attacks can be correlated with total imported goods into the country from 
the United States. 
Table 2 presents the correlation of terrorist attacks with imported 
commodities in both countries. All tables and graphs in this Part are 
drawn from the START data recorded in Table 1, compared with country 
trade statistics taken from the International Trade Centre’s tables cover-
ing 2001-2019.128 The results show uneven support for this theory. In 
Egypt, the chosen test case, suicide attacks have weaker correlations with 
imports of United States’ commodities than does non-suicide terrorism, 
contrary to expectations. The Lebanon results are similarly unimpressive: 
although both relationships are weak, the suicides are slightly behind gen-
eral terrorist attacks. 
Table 2: Total US Imports x Terrorist Attacks 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EGYPT 
Total US Imports 
1,832,166 1,684,285 1,272,951 1,351,227 1,769,758 1,603,710 
Suicide Att. 0 0 0 3 2 0 
Non-Suicide 0 0 0 0 0 5 
LEBANON 
Total US Imports 
515,957 466,043 432,306 554,268 548,532 1,038,611 
Suicide Att. 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Non-Suicide 5 8 5 1 17 7 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EGYPT 
Total US Imports 
2,571,843 5,673,135 4,744,216 4,961,898 6,470,100 5,276,494 
Suicide Att. 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Non-Suicide 0 1 2 2 16 49 
LEBANON 
Total US Imports 
1,140,911 1,848,558 1,770,103 1,919,314 1,994,558 2,375,536 
Suicide Att. 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Non-Suicide 17 57 14 5 10 15 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 r 
EGYPT 
Total US Imports 
5,214,723 5,198,838 4,378,825 3,095,178 3,896,808  
Suicide Att. 9 5 16 9 16 .20 
Non-Suicide 312 349 631 367 208 .29 
LEBANON 
Total US Imports 
1,500,404 1,226,783 1,024,379 1,184,073 1,048,133  
 
 128. International Trade in Goods  – Imports 2001-2019, INT’L TRADE CTR., http://www.in-
tracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-product-country/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
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Suicide Att. 6 13 4 2 2 .04 
Non-Suicide 115 191 40 39 21 .15 
The proposal, however, does not describe a one-to-one relationship 
between marketing and suicidal terrorism such that imports influence at-
titudes and spur attacks all in the same year. While cultural shocks that 
lead to such immediate effects are possible, the more likely progression 
will be a sequence of influences from commodity introduction and adver-
tising to perceived weakening of local norms, culminating in an existen-
tial crisis that triggers the possibility of suicidal defense. In other words, 
the model locates the cause for suicide attacks not in contemporaneous 
foreign imports, but as flowing from the repercussion of earlier imports. 
To test this possibility, the import data was projected forward for 
each of ten years to see what pattern emerged. Table 3 summarizes the 
way time-shifting the trade data impacts correlations with attacks. This 









Graph 1: Time-Shifted Imports x Attacks Correlations (Egypt) 
Table 3: Time-Shifted Imports x Terrorist Attacks Correlations 
EGYPT N N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 
Suicide 0.20 0.26 0.52 0.62 0.76 0.84 
Non-Suicide 0.29 0.47 0.64 0.07 0.83 0.85 
LEBANON N N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 
Suicide 0.08 0.29 0.59 0.54 0.51 0.52 
Non-Suicide 0.15 0.37 0.62 0.48 0.44 0.41 
EGYPT N N-6 N-7 N-8 N-9 N-10 
Suicide 0.20 0.83 0.87 0.62 0.57 0.46 
Non-Suicide 0.29 0.74 0.77 0.38 -0.01 -0.21 
LEBANON N N-6 N-7 N-8 N-9 N-10 
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As applied to Egypt, the model performs well. The correlation fa-
vors both general and suicide terrorism for the first five years after a mar-
ket disruption. Thereafter, the relationship with general terrorism begins 
to fall to the extent that by ten years later, the correlation is negative. The 
rate of suicide attacks, however, continues to rise. Although the rate has 
decreased in later years, it remains well above both the correlation for 
general terrorism and initial values towards the end of the examined term. 
This is the pattern one would anticipate if the resort to suicide attacks 
comes after an extended process of weakening and dissatisfaction with 
the effectiveness of the traditional immortality projects.129 
For comparison, Graph 2 shows the same relationships for Lebanon. 
Again, general terrorist attacks display a slightly better relationship with 
American imports than do suicide attacks; however, two years later the 
types of attacks cross over and suicide attacks remain more correlated 
with imports for the next four years. After the sixth year, both forms of 
attacks decrease. By the end of the sequence, although both correlations 










Graph 2: Time-Shifted Imports x Attacks Correlations (Lebanon) 
The broad conclusion from this comparison is that to the extent that 
the posited relationship exerts an influence on the incidence of suicide 
terrorism, it varies for each country. According to the graphs, the intro-
duction of suicide attacks into Egyptian conflicts is linked not to market 
forces in 1993, but instead the market conflicts of 1986. In contrast, in 
 
 129. Although the current initial investigation treats trade data as a single isolated point, further 
refinements would account for trade as an ongoing additive social input over several years. 
 130. On a broad methodological note, future investigations, rather than comparing total U.S. 
imports, should consider that the predicted relationship holds mainly in categories containing lux-
ury goods that reflect status and self-esteem rather than life necessities. For example, description 
of the problem suggests that items of personal significance such as clothing and toiletries risk a 
more disruptive cultural influence than imports of basic foodstuffs like grains. 
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Lebanon, market changes in the mid-1970s would lead to the compara-
tively early use of suicide attacks.131  
The overall feasibility of the model receives additional support from 
an independent perspective: the subjective perceptions of Egyptians as 
reported in ethnographies. From these descriptions we learn that new con-
sumer patterns have significantly impacted the lives of ordinary Egyp-
tians, and largely for the worse. Samuli Schielke, working among rural, 
lower middle class men in villages in northern Egypt, recognized that 
over the past decades “sustained economical growth [has] filled the cit-
ies’ streets . . . with private cars and new red-brick buildings of up to six 
floors [having] transformed the appearance of villages.”132 Unfortunately, 
this material bounty has exacted a steep price. Objectively, Egyptians ap-
pear to be better off; yet amidst this prosperity “almost everyone bitterly 
complained about increasing economic pressure, corruption and nepo-
tism, and deepening social divisions.”133  
The difficulties associated with marriage illustrate this tension be-
tween the economic advantages from the new capitalism and the in-
creased psychological pressures. “One of the greatest paradoxes of life in 
contemporary Egypt is that in a society where marriage is considered a 
self-evident, destiny-like necessity, it has become increasingly difficult 
to get married. The primary reason for that difficulty is the rising cost of 
marriage.”134 Indeed, anthropologist Farha Ghannam in her writings 
about her work with a low-income neighborhood in Cairo states that, 
“[G]etting married has become more and more challenging,” leading to a 
“marriage crisis” in Egypt.135 
At first glance, this may not strike the Western reader as a unique 
problem. The costs of weddings have risen significantly in most societies, 
 
 131. Accessible longitudinal economic data from Lebanon from available sources such as the 
World Bank and the official Lebanon Central Administration of Statistics do not report data earlier 
than the mid-1980s, so it has not been possible to pursue this suggestion further. 
 132. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 154-55. 
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management of the body in particular.”). See also SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 114 (“[B]ecause 
people consider marriage a singularly important form of social becoming, and because of the avail-
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with the average cost in the United States approaching $34,000.136 How-
ever, the real difficulty arises from the compulsory nature of these ex-
penses. The problem, as Schielke’s informants describe, is that “while 
most Egyptians can now buy many more things than they could twenty 
or fifty years ago, buying those things is not something one can choose 
to do in most cases, they are things one must buy, even if they may seem 
a dispensable luxury to an outsider . . . [C]onsumption is not a choice. It 
is a necessity.”137 The marriage suitor is expected to have accumulated a 
significant list of goods, while the standard of what is deemed acceptable 
by the woman’s family is continuously rising. Consequently,  
the existential comfort of having a little more than one needs has 
transformed into something more peculiar: an anxious combina-
tion of pressure and aspiration to realize a constantly better life 
by accumulating more wealth . . . . [M]any among those people 
do not experience growth as a comforting margin of surplus. In-
stead, they experience it as pressing scarcity . . . .138 
This social pressure to consume has been accompanied by new 
forms of advertising to hawk those wares and to create the perceived 
needs. For example, a Turkish report states that,  
[o]ne prominent material consumer object that has played a ma-
jor role in the transformation of modern Turkey identity is the 
diamond solitaire engagement ring. Formerly a status symbol of 
the wealthy, the solitaire now, thanks to a massive media cam-
paign by DeBeers’ Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and the 
2006 song “Pirlanta” (“Diamond”) by Turkish pop singer Nil 
Karaibrahimgil, has been embraced by the new emerging mid-
dle class, and as a result, can be found in every mall jewelry 
shop.139 
One survey found that “almost 82% [of survey takers] . . . 
acknowledge that print ads are currently much more focused on sex” 
which offended most Egyptian respondents, but were deemed inoffensive 
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by most non-Egyptians.140 In other words, while the rise of consumer ex-
pectations is inherently anxiety-provoking, the baseline pressures are ex-
acerbated by the accompanying ancillary services that support that mar-
ket economy. Commercials “overwhelmingly feature blond Egyptians 
(and often blond foreigners with Egyptian voice-over), racy clothes, and 
a generally Western-oriented attitude,”141 which stir up further discomfort 
in local societies.  
The negative effects of consumer capitalism are not completely in-
evitable. The narrative should not be framed as a necessary clash between 
Western values and Middle Eastern traditions. Societies and individuals 
are equipped to make the transition as best one can. For example, Johanna 
Pink collected essays describing largely unproblematic incorporation of 
consumer values in a range of Muslim societies.142 To “interpret Egyptian 
popular culture either as a straightforward imitation of the West or, con-
versely, as cryptic resistance to hegemonic power, would as often as not 
lead one to misunderstand the character of the art.”143 Instead of a conflict 
of cultures, Egyptians “aspire to make global modernity their own, with-
out becoming homogenized or fully connected in the sense evoked by 
globalization.”144 Although the effort at syncretism can itself be problem-
atic,145 the immediate lesson here is that the process is challenging. Even 
if the process is largely successful across a population, a significant mi-
nority may feel so alienated as to seek a different path to resolution. The 
fuller development of the present model would operationalize the size of 
the excluded population and the force and abruptness of the market inser-
tions to capture the variability of incidents of suicide terrorism by civil-
ians. 
The impact of these influences can strike deeply into the psyche of 
that population, complicating already tenuous developmental processes. 
For example, the “growing emphasis on consumption” has impacted the 
structure of men’s self-identity.146 However, the means to achieve this 
recognized adult status can often compel individuals “to make 
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compromises that potentially undermined his view of himself as a man in 
order to satisfy the requests of others that were essential to socially pro-
ducing him as a man.”147 To acquire the external markers of manhood—
which are largely procured in the marketplace—it can be necessary to 
breach the values that constitute the internal achievements of manhood. 
In sum, there seem to be few ways for the ordinary person to succeed at 
the common goals of life in this new, consumer-oriented society without 
paying a high psychological toll. 
Many informants report being overwhelmed by these forces, leading 
to a state of anxiety that Schielke’s sources describe as feeling “bored,” 
a term drawing upon the world-weariness associated with the related con-
dition of ennui. Boredom, perhaps paradoxically, “came to the village 
hand in hand with education, mass media, and mobility,”148 or the kinds 
of developments that might be expected to lead to new, exciting opportu-
nities. Instead, boredom “is more an existential state of lacking of future 
and hope, which is intimately coupled with frustration and often close to 
despair.”149 In keeping with the existential philosophers in the West, 
Egyptians believe that the “solution to boredom is doing something 
meaningful.”150 
As previously described, a wide range of cultural solutions responds 
to the need to find meaning in a life experienced as pointless and unful-
filling. Indeed, anything at all can serve the purpose, so long as it is as-
signed the role of “ultimate concern” in the individual’s psychology.151 
But without question, the institution specifically tailored to this task is 
religion: “[r]eligious armor allows one to cope with life’s disappoint-
ments in an unknown, modern, pluralistic world, when everyday control 
is removed, and thus supra-human power is required.”152 Both of these 
generalizations are found in the reasons given to account for one of 
Schielke’s informant’s turn toward Salafi fundamentalism as following 
upon an urgent personal crisis experienced as a moral vacuum. In 
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Mustafa’s words, it was a matter of urgently wanting to be able to “know 
right from wrong.”153 Interestingly, Mustafa’s later military service 
served the same purpose, “[t]he military service kept him busy, and in a 
peculiar fashion it offered him something of the same thing he had been 
searching for in Salafism.” Mustafa stated, “I feel at peace because eve-
rything has a clear structure, you don’t have to think for yourself.”154  
Having experienced the anxiety-provoking effects of living in a con-
sumer-oriented society, people seeking a better solution, such as Mustafa, 
often seek out religion.155 For many, this newfound immersion in reli-
gious orthodoxy has been effective. Among Schielke’s informants, those 
involved in religion claimed to have found a way to avoid the pitfalls of 
“boredom”: “[w]e as Muslims do not feel so much boredom because 
when you pray regularly, it gives you hope again every time.”156  
Consequently, “[a]mong the Muslim majority of the population, an 
Islamic revival has made a scripturally-oriented and conservative sense 
of religiosity the most powerful source of moral certainty and existential 
hope.”157 However, the decision to rely on religious belief to serve this 
psychological role creates its own secondary anxieties that lead to “the 
cultivation of an anxious vigilance toward anything that could relativize 
the certainty of religion as an absolute truth about all interpretation, ne-
gotiation, and reconciliation.”158 Religious commitment in this environ-
ment takes the form of “a double move of emphatic attachment to a shared 
ground of truth and certainty, and a heightened anxiety and sensitivity 
toward those who do not share that firm ground.”159  
While Westerners might rely upon compartmentalization to avoid 
the full thrust of the cognitive dissonance between conflicting values,160 
many Egyptians find that approach unsustainable: 
It might seem as if different worlds stood here side by side: the 
world of Islam as a regime of divine protection, order, and jus-
tice; the world of global capitalism with its investment in finan-
cial schemes; the world of commercial media with its reliance 
on consumerism, advertisement, and desire; the world of 
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romantic love with its celebration of passion. But these are not 
different worlds. They are constituents, parts, of people’s life-
worlds—lifeworlds that can never be explained by any single 
principle but that must be understood in their complexity and 
openness, in their many hopes and frustrations.161 
The result for some Egyptians is that, in order to avoid a break-
through of the contrary examples of personal meaning, the threat of exis-
tential anxiety can lead to defensive reactions against the new values. 
Closing the argument, we finally learn that “[p]eople often also see bore-
dom and depression as related phenomena, and in one occasion people I 
talked with also associated boredom with the issue of suicide.”162  
Suicide for Egyptians, according to Ghannam, is not necessarily the 
manifestation of a sickly attitude toward life, as it is for Westerners, but 
can instead be a path to the valued “good ending”: 
One may be tempted to understand the Egyptian notion of good 
ending as a negation of life, a sign of fatalism and irrationality, 
a call for people to value only the afterlife and ignore the current 
one. As argued by Charles Hirschkind, for “many in the West 
today, Muslim discourses on death are taken as evidence of a 
diseased culture, one frequently epitomized in the figure of the 
suicide bomber.” Yet this simplistic and hasty conclusion does 
not capture how the notion of good death establishes a strong 
relationship between this life and the afterlife, between one’s re-
ligious devotion and engagement with the community, and be-
tween one’s deeds and intentions . . . . [R]ather than a sign of 
fatalism, the notion of good death is a sign of realism. Instead of 
denying death, distancing it from the self, and turning it into a 
taboo that should be hidden, the meaning of the good ending 
highlights the fact that no one can escape death and offers ways 
to manage this biological, social, and religious fact . . . . [T]he 
notion of good death in fact encourages a deep ethical and prac-
tical engagement in the life of one’s family and community.”163 
Having begun with the increased consumerism within Egyptian so-
ciety, the ethnographic narrative traces how the ramifications of those 
changes can lead many to experience “boredom” as a result of new inse-
curities arising from economic pressures, which in turn influences a small 
portion of these individuals to consider suicide as an appropriate manner 
to resolve these contradictions with a “good ending.” This approach may 
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combine with a renewed religious commitment in order to remedy the 
existential vacuum created by reliance on the inferior and contradictory 
consumer-driven values. The two pressures can converge, mutually rein-
forcing one another into a lack of tolerance for contradictory views. This 
concatenation of influences may be comparatively rare, but when they 
occur the result can be literally explosive.  
VIII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Terrorism, while a problem, is not a mystery. The motivations of 
actors to resort to nonconventional military methods to press their inter-
ests are not conceptually dissimilar to the strategies of soldiers on more 
traditional battlefields. However differently the law may treat the actions, 
the individual psychologies that motivate the violence employ the same 
elements, albeit to different effects. 
The same cannot be said about suicide terrorism; for otherwise men-
tally healthy individuals to commit to schemes that require their own 
deaths bewilders, even frightens most onlookers. While some subsume 
this behavior as a special case of general terrorism—meaning that the 
same explanatory variables for the latter will apply also to the former—
the best available evidence contradicts this interpretative stance. Rather, 
suicide terrorism in most cases appears to be a sui generis phenomenon 
needing its own explanation. 
The present discussion attempts to provide the missing explanation 
by employing TMT, which describes how we seek to dispel death anxiety 
through meanings assigned by cultural symbols. The rise of suicide ter-
rorism can then be accounted for as the outcome of undermining those 
cultural solutions with competing inferior solutions, in this case con-
sumer capitalism. The TMT perspective promises to encompass a wider 
range of related phenomena than other competing approaches. While this 
discussion has focused on one example by providing an account for the 
differential resort to suicide terrorism, other problems could be similarly 
explained, such as the lone wolf terrorist.  
 Suicide terrorism, though, is a complex behavior, and while the 
available evidence offers initial support for this narrative, it is unlikely to 
be a complete explanation at the level of particulars. Granting that sui-
cidism springs from existential variables, not all irruptions of these diffi-
culties will be traced back to economic conditions. Some instances will 
continue to be better explained by political or other social dimensions. In 
this sense, Pape’s analysis that suicide terrorism is primarily about U.S. 
FINAL_FOR_JCI  8/3/21  4:45 PM 
38 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
military insertions continues to serve as an intelligible proximate cause.164 
We get a glimpse of the existence of these alternatives when looking 
again at Table 1. Israel, for example, cannot be easily described as having 
experienced an insertion of new and alien capitalist markets. It is there-
fore unsurprising that despite its recurring experience with suicide at-
tacks, the relationship between START counts for suicide attacks and 
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The need for a different approach such as the one offered here has 
arisen because the political model also does not fully account for the pat-
tern of suicide incidents. The TMT-grounded model presented here 
serves as the shared ultimate cause, the preservation of cultural signifi-
cance-defining institutions, explaining why many would find self-annihi-
lation in defense of the idea of a country (like Palestine) attractive, while 
not requiring that overt political views are the sine qua non of suicide 
attacks.  
What, then, can be done to respond to the ongoing threat of suicide 
terrorism attacks? An Obama Department of State official was heavily 
ridiculed for suggesting that instead of striving to bomb jihadists out of 
existence, we needed to address the root causes by giving them jobs.165 
Despite the mockery, this approach makes sense because if money has 
become the new immortality project, we must offer the means for people 
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to earn income so that they feel that their immortality goals are achieva-
ble:  
We see the pattern over and over . . . . [I]f you have prosperity, 
something that gives them work and opportunity, you address 
the communities’ main vulnerability. If the livelihoods are 
strong enough, they get a community that is strong enough to 
band together again when they face a threat.166 
In an ideal world, the response to suicide terrorism would be to scale 
back capitalistic incursions into cultural environments where they would 
be alien and disruptive influences, and to require that marketers conform 
not to the values of the Western-identified elites, but to those of the ordi-
nary folk. This point is especially true regarding any accompanying ad-
vertisements that preach a foreign need for those new items.  
Since such a humane policy of globalized economics is unlikely, 
and in any event the damage has already been done, the most likely out-
come is two-fold. First, reports exist of programs to “deradicalize” insur-
gents when offered the kind of job training and economic support that the 
theory expects should make a difference.167 However, this approach is not 
easily scalable. While these efforts describe successes, they require indi-
vidual treatment that is not commensurate with the scope of the problem.  
Even without such interventions, the second long-term prospect is 
that suicide terrorism—or at least the percentage of it that has its roots in 
economic variables—is likely to gradually age out of the world stage as 
the culture shock initiated by aggressive capitalistic marketing becomes 
the “new normal.” We are perhaps already seeing the beginning of this 
development: a recent overview found that while absolute numbers are 
on the rise, relative to general terrorism, suicide attacks are not increas-
ing,168 and may even be noticeably decreasing.169 A final look at the pat-
tern of incidents in Table 1 conveys the impression that after the appear-
ance of suicide attacks, incidents reach a peak and then begin to cycle 
down. For example, while Sri Lanka continues to experience attacks of 
general terrorism, it has seen no suicide attacks since 2010.  
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Given that the world has become more chaotic, theories that ground 
terrorism and suicide terrorism in political resistance probably would not 
predict the decline in suicidism we are presently observing. Civilians will 
no doubt become more dissatisfied as they grow accustomed to the re-
placement of local values, and will begin to report the levels of mental 
illness common to Americans. They will, however, grow to view the pre-
vailing mindset as just the way things are, and concentrate on working to 
find their place within the new order rather than seeking to push it back 
through violent opposition to restore an earlier system.  
Regardless of how the question of suicide attacks develops, we may 
conclude on the observation that, according to the perspective defended 
here, the problem arose at least in part because the major powers have 
been myopic regarding the value of alternative ways of living. The West 
has appeared to commit itself to the proposition that material advance-
ment is not simply useful, but represents the highest moral good. This 
belief has led the West to expect that others should share that priority, 
even when it is unlikely they will all ever be able to enjoy the same ben-
efits.170 Yet given that many societies do not share the American view of 
the independent self, cultural insults that a Westerner might shrug off be-
cause of an individualist focus might be devastating to someone with an 
interdependent concept of self.171  
There is nothing natural or inevitable in the cultural primacy of ma-
terial acquisition, and many societies have structured for themselves dif-
ferent symbolic resources to assign meaning and significance to thereby 
dissolve the death paradox. Global actors need to be more sensitive to 
how these alternative ways of living are impacted by foreign marketing 
and economic insertions. These intrusions need to be tied to the existing 
symbols and lifeways, over time.172 As Eric Hoffer observed a generation 
ago,  
[e]ven when a colonial power is wholly philanthropic and its 
sole aim is to bring prosperity and progress to a . . . people, it 
must do all it can to preserve and reinforce the corporate pattern. 
It must not concentrate on the individual but inject the 
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innovations and reforms into tribal or communal channels and 
let the tribe or the community progress as a whole.173 
If the spread of capitalism is, as some claim, inevitable, we have a 
duty, or if nothing else a self-serving interest, to assure that this transition 
occurs in a way that minimizes ideological disruption and thus violent, 
yet predictable, blowback.  
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